Richard Bistrong, a writer, speaker, and blogger on anti-bribery compliance issues, contributes the following guest post:
As the recent OECD Foreign Bribery Report
made clear, debarment (prohibiting the defendant company or individual
to engage in future government contracting) is very rarely used as a
sanction in foreign bribery cases, most likely because prosecutors worry
that debarment would be an excessive penalty that would often do too
much collateral damage to innocent parties. I have argued that
debarment can and should be used more frequently, and that the
legitimate concerns about disproportionate punishment can be addressed
by using various forms of “partial debarment.” In a recent post,
Professor Stephenson draws attention to a number of potential
shortcomings to my proposal. While I agree with some of his points, I
think he understates the ways in which debarment—as distinct from fines
or other monetary penalties—can have a distinctive deterrent effect on
foreign bribery, and why partial debarment might therefore often be
appropriate.
Let me try to clarify where Professor Stephenson and I disagree, where we may disagree, and why partial debarment is a sanction that government enforcers ought to employ more often. Read more of this post
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